Zehua Jiang

Procedural Content Generation via Reinforcement Learning (PCGRL) foregoes the need for large human-authored data-sets and allows agents to train explicitly on functional constraints, using computable, user-defined measures of quality instead of target output. We explore the application of PCGRL to 3D domains, in which content-generation tasks naturally have greater complexity and potential pertinence to real-world applications. Here, we introduce several PCGRL tasks for the 3D domain, Minecraft. These tasks will challenge RL-based generators using affordances often found in 3D environments, such as jumping, multiple dimensional movement, and gravity. We train agents to optimize each of these tasks to explore the capabilities of existing in PCGRL. The agents are able to generate relatively complex and diverse levels, and generalize to random initial states and control targets. Controllability tests in the presented tasks demonstrate their utility to analyze success and failure for 3D generators. We argue that these generators could serve both as co-creative tools for game designers, and as pre-trained environment generators in curriculum learning for player agents.

This work expands on previous advancements in genetic fingerprint spoofing via the DeepMasterPrints and introduces Diversity and Novelty MasterPrints. This system uses quality diversity evolutionary algorithms to generate dictionaries of artificial prints with a focus on increasing coverage of users from the dataset. The Diversity MasterPrints focus on generating solution prints that match with users not covered by previously found prints, and the Novelty MasterPrints explicitly search for prints with more that are farther in user space than previous prints. Our multi-print search methodologies outperform the singular DeepMasterPrints in both coverage and generalization while maintaining quality of the fingerprint image output.

A dictionary attack in a biometric system entails the use of a small number of strategically generated images or templates to successfully match with a large number of identities, thereby compromising security. We focus on dictionary attacks at the template level, specifically the IrisCodes used in iris recognition systems. We present an hitherto unknown vulnerability wherein we mix IrisCodes using simple bitwise operators to generate alpha-mixtures— alpha-wolves (combining a set of "wolf" samples) and alpha-mammals (combining a set of users selected via search optimization) that increase false matches. We evaluate this vulnerability using the IITD, CASIA-IrisV4-Thousand and Synthetic datasets, and observe that an alpha-wolf (from two wolves) can match upto 71 identities @FMR=0.001%, while an alpha-mammal (from two identities) can match upto 133 other identities @FMR=0.01% on the IITD dataset.